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I. INTRODUCTION
Although price controls have achieved little success, they have
long been a mainstay of Brazilian economic policy.1 Recently, this
* A.B. Brown University; J.D., cum laude, University of Miami School of Law. Ms.
Landy is currently a litigation associate with Paul, Landy, Beiley & Harper in Miami,
Florida.
1. See generally T. BRUNEAU & P. FAUCHER. AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM - BRAznL's CON-
TEMPORARY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEvELOPMzNT (1981) (a collection of essays on general
economic development and industrialization of the Brazilian economy); Galloway, Brazil in
LATIN AMERICA - GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 324-82 (H. Blakemore & C. Smith 2d ed.
1983) (article gives a short, very general outline of Brazil's economic development since the
1500s with tables projecting future economic growth); L. PEmIA, DEvELOPMENT AND CmsIS
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policy created severe problems as it forced many price-controlled
companies to operate at a loss.2 This Note discusses the response
of Autolatina, the holding company for two of the largest car mak-
ers in Brazil (Volkswagen do Brasil, S.A. and Ford do Brasil, S.A.),
to price controls. The Note further discusses price controls as
creeping expropriation and whether Autolatina would have re-




Brazil has been highly attractive to foreign investors. Brazil's
abundant natural resources, vast territory, and large population,3
together with government subsidies and protection for investors,
have induced multinational corporations to invest.' In 1987, Brazil
overtook Canada as the world's eighth largest economy with a sig-
nificant rise in gross national product 5 and a US$12.5 billion trade
surplus.' However, a US$103 billion foreign debt and a runaway
inflation rate indicated that Brazil had serious economic
difficulties.
7
B. Inflation and Price Controls
Inflation is a chronic problem in Brazil. The Government's ec-
IN BRAzE 1930-1983 (1984).
2. See generally Bruce, Brazil's Crackdown on Inflation Worries Multinational Com-
panies, J. CoM. & COM., Feb. 3, 1987, at 1A; Bruce, Brazil's Austerity Measures Protested, J.
CoM. & COM., Nov. 25, 1986, at 3A; Bruce, Brazil's Inflation Gains Threatened, J. CoM. &
COM., July 10, 1986, at IA.
3. Today, Brazil's population is over 153,000,000. WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS
657 (1989).
4. See J. VILLEGAS, BRAzEL AS A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979); see also Ev-
ans, State, Local and Multinational Capital in Brazil: Prospects for the Stabilization of
the Triple Alliance in the Eighties, in LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 139-68 (D.
Tussie ed. 1983).
5. Brazil's GNP has risen faster than that of any other large country. Cruzado En-
throned: Brazil's New Currency Needs More Than a Price Freeze to Support It, ECONO-
MIST, Mar. 8, 1986, at 13 [hereinafter Cruzado Enthroned]; Brazil's New Beat, MACLEANS,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 18.
6. Cruzado Enthroned, supra note 5, at 14. Brazil's trade surplus is the third largest in
the world. Id.




onomic policies raised the inflation rate from 235% in 1985 to
416% in 1987. The inflation rate for 1988 was 1038%; for 1989,
1783%; and for 1990, 1795%.' Brazil's perennial response to infla-
tion has been to implement price controls, despite their proven in-
effectiveness. In 1979, Brazil attempted to combat inflation by lim-
iting producers to two price changes per year. These changes were
to correspond to fluctuations in general price levels, not actual
cost.9 This decision was a catastrophe. Companies experienced
such severe losses that a number of them threatened to close
down.'0 The plan was abandoned only a year later for a system
where companies could set their own prices within guidelines set
by the Interminesterial Price Commission (ComissAo Interminis-
terial de Prevos) (CIP). This system was known as "Liberdade
Vigiada" (monitored freedom)."
Price controls only conceal or repress inflationary pressure
without removing its cause.' 2 An excess in demand over supply fu-
els inflation; fixing prices at levels lower than those set by market
forces stimulates demand, thereby accelerating inflation.' s Brazil's
economic history provides many salient examples. 4 Nevertheless,
price controls have remained an integral part of Brazil's economic
reforms. In 1986, when Brazil froze prices as part of the Cruzado I
and II plans,'5 the Government kept price increases significantly
8. CoNJuNrtRA ECONOMICA, Nov. 1990, at 130.
9. Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Critical Analysis, 15 LAW.
Am. 307, 350 (1983).
10. Id. at 349-50; BusiNEss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION. MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY IN A
BRAziL UNDER PRESStR 91-96 (1981) [hereinafter MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY].
11. Rosenn, supra note 9, at 350; MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY, supra note 10, at 91-93.
12. K. SA SENA, PRICING POLICY AND PRICE CONTROLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28-29
(1986); see also J.K. GALBRAITm, A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL (1952).
13. See Rosenn, supra note 9, at 350; MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY, supra note 10, at 91-93.
Price controls must correspond to actual needs and leave sufficient room for profit so that
producers retain the incentive and the means to compete in the marketplace. See also M.
VAN MEERHAEGLE, PRICE CONTROL AND PRICE POLICY (1969). Furthermore, price controls nec-
essarily create a black market which operates on its own level of supply and demand. There-
fore, the inflationary effects of price controls depend on which prices are studied - official
prices or black market prices.
14. See generally Arida & Lara-Resende, Inertial Inflation and Monetary Reform:
Brazil, in INFLATION AND INDEXATION 27 (J. Williamson ed. 1985); Thunberg, Brazil's Inter-
rupted Economic Miracle, in BANxs, PETRODOLLARS, AND SOVEREIGN DEBToas 99 (P. Hart-
land, H. Thunberg & C. Ebinger ed. 1986).
15. The Cruzado Plan also replaced the old "cruzeiro" with new currency, the "cru-
zado," officially set at 13.8 to the US dollar. Stop Passing the Buck, TIM, Aug. 25, 1986, at
49.
When Argentina introduced a new currency, the "austral," to combat inflation, the in-
flation rate went down. The drop, however, was due primarily to a sharp cut in a budget
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below the reported inflation rate.16
C. The Role of the Price Commission (CIP)
The CIP is the principal agency for setting price ceilings and
general price policy.17 In 1981, the CIP controlled the prices of
75% of Brazilian industrial products. 8 All companies whose an-
nual sales exceeded one million United States dollars had to sub-
mit price requests on lengthy questionnaires to the CIP for ap-
proval each time they sought to change their prices."' The CIP did
not follow explicit, detailed regulations in reaching its pricing deci-
sions, and no appeal procedure from those decisions existed.2 0 In
order to respond to the rapid inflation, firms needed to change
prices every month. Unfortunately, delays, paperwork, and eco-
nomic uncertainty created insurmountable obstacles for companies
subjected to price controls.21
Initially, the Plano Cruzado, an "anti-inflationary" price con-
trol law enacted in 1986, received popular support, especially from
consumers.22 Consumers supported the freeze because it increased
deficit previously running at 12% of GNP. Brazil has not attempted similar budget cuts.
Cruzado Enthroned, supra note 5, at 14; Roett, Brazil: Economic Crisis and Policy Options,
in BRAzIL's ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FUTURE (J. Chacel, P. Falk & D. Fleischer ed. 1988).
16. Rosenn, supra note 9, at 350.
17. Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 LAw. Am. 169, 183-84
(1981) [hereinafter Trends]. Other agencies that control prices are the National Superinten-
dency of Private Insurance (SUSEP), which provides insurance rates, and the National Pe-
troleum Council (NPC), which sets gasoline prices.
18. Id. In 1980, the CIP was demoted to an administrative arm of the Special Secreta-
riat for Prices and Supplies, which directly coordinated pricing policies under the more lib-
eral ideas of the "Liberdade Vigiada." Thus, the CIP lost a great deal of independent eco-
nomic decision-making power. MANAGING SUCCESSFULLy, supra note 10, at 91. The re-
instatement of more rigid price controls in 1986, however, restored to the CIP much of this
lost power. See generally BRAzIL's ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FUTURE (J. Chacel, P. Falk & D.
Fleischer ed. 1988).
19. MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY, supra note 10, at 92-96. Not only are the questionnaires
lengthy, but they are also quite costly to prepare and submit. Id.
20. Rosenn, supra note 9, at 350. The Autolatina case, however, documents an instance
where the CIP's rulings were not the last word.
21. Trends, supra note 17, at 183.
22. The Plano Cruzado, or Cruzado Plan, included a price freeze on goods and a wage
increase which was to escalate in accord with the consumer price index. Baer & Beckerman,
The Decline and Fall of Brazil's Cruzado, 24 LATN Am. Rls. Rav. 35, 39 (1989). For a
discussion of the popular support for the Cruzado Plan, see Cruzado Enthroned, supra note
5, at 13; Sayad, Brazil's Economic Stabilization Plan: An Analysis, in B&azn.'s EcoNoMIc
AND POLITICAL FUTURE 9, 12 (J. Chacel, P. Falk & D. Fleischer ed. 1988). Some consumers
even went so far as to block checkout counters of stores that defied the price freeze. Cru-
zado Enthroned, supra note 5, at 13.
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their earnings while keeping prices low thus giving them more
spending power; they accordingly gained confidence in their gov-
ernment.23 The program met early economic success as well. Even-
tually, however, the frozen prices and higher spending power cre-
ated excessive demand, which, in turn, created shortages of many
products (especially meat, eggs, and automobiles) and sent the in-
flation rate soaring once again.24 By August 1987, inflation was offi-
cially reported at 6% per month, although non-government sources
reported it at over 10% per month.2 5 By November 1987, the cu-
mulative inflation rate was up to 338%.26 Once again, the very
measures chosen to lower inflation actually fueled it, and the CIP's
lack of coherence and effectiveness was evident. Meanwhile, many
businesses reacted to the crisis by freezing investment plans.2"
Some businesses considered even more drastic measures, including
pulling out of Brazil completely.2" It is in this context of stringent
price controls and rampant inflation that the Autolatina case
developed.
III. FORMATION OF AUTOLATINA
Volkswagen's establishment of an automobile manufacturing
plant in Brazil in the mid-1950s marked the emergence of Brazil as
an economic force. ' Most of Brazil's economic development is at-
tributable to the auto industry and its spinoffs as catalysts for in-
dustrial development.3 Ford, Fiat, Chrysler, General Motors, and
others eventually joined Volkswagen in the Brazilian market.
Thus, a variety of foreign auto manufacturers were subjected to
23. The increased confidence in the Government did not derive from the substance of
the measures taken, but from the fact that measures were actually initiated at all. Sayad,
supra note 22, at 12.
24. Stop Passing the Buck, supra note 15; Cruzado Enthroned, supra note 5, at 14;
RIP, Cruzado: Why Brazil's Anti-Inflation but Pro-growth Plan Collapsed, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 10, 1987, at 15.
25. New Austerity Measures Slated in Brazil, J. CoM. & CoM., Aug. 26, 1987, at 1A;
Brazilian Inflation Rises, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
26. Id. To be sure, the accuracy of all reported inflation rates is suspect because infla-
tion rises so quickly that figures can vary greatly depending on the date of the analysis. For
a more thorough analysis of the Piano Cruzado's effect on inflation, see Baer & Beckerman,
supra note 22.
27. Brazil's New Beat, supra note 5, at 19-21.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 19. See also de Denghy, Tracing Brazil's Auto History, AtrroMorvk NEws,
Nov. 26, 1984, at 62.
30. See Fleischer, Epilogue to BRAzaL's ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FuTuRE 257 (J. Chacel,
P. Falk & D. Fleischer ed. 1988).
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the vacillations in profits and losses that resulted from the Govern-
ment's economic policies.81
Ford do Brasil, which controlled 30% of the Brazilian auto
market, lost substantial amounts of money in the first half of the
1980s.-" Volkswagen do Brasil, Brazil's largest automaker with
40% of the market, also operated at a loss during the same time
period. 3 Consequently, in 1986, Ford and Volkswagen began nego-
tiating a joint venture to lower production costs. Initially, the two
companies focused on Argentina, but soon switched their sights to
Brazil due to Brazil's larger domestic market and superior base for
exports. 4
The two companies were a good match because Ford had spare
capacity in engine production and Volkswagen needed engines for
some of its newer models.36 Autolatina's fifteen plants (ten in Bra-
zil and five in Argentina) had a capacity of 700,000 to 900,000 cars
and trucks, employed 75,000 people, and had projected annual
sales in excess of US$4 billion, with US$3.5 billion slated for
export.36
Autolatina began operating with US$1.8 billion in equity and
a substantial five year investment plan."7 In 1987, however, Autola-
tina experienced losses of over US$400 million and was forced to
fire 15,000 workers primarily because of government price con-
31. Brazilian Autornakers Prepare for New Boom, J. Com. & Com., July 31, 1987, at IA;
Automaker8 Face Conflict in Brazil, J. Com. & CoM., June 31, 1986, at 5A; Wall St. J., Aug.
28, 1987, at 12, col. 4.
32. Latin Touches, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1986, at 74; Ryser, Ford and VW: A Marriage
of Convenience, Bus. WiL, Dec. 8, 1986, at 53.
33. Turner, VW and Ford to Cut Losses with Merger in Brazil, Argentina; VW's Share
51%, AuToMoTv NEws, Dec. 1, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Merger in Brazil]. In 1986, the
combined losses of Volkswagen and Ford totalled between $120 and $150 million. Turner,
VW-Ford Firm May Expand in Latin America, AuTromomr-v NEws, Dec. 22, 1986, at 1
[hereinafter Expansion].
34. Latin Touches, supra note 33, at 74.
35. Ford, in 1986, produced 30,000 cars in its Buenos Aires plant which had a capacity
of 100,000 cars. With the merger, Volkswagen could produce an additional 20,000 cars at
this plant. The Ford plant in SAo Paolo was only producing 100,000 cars despite a capacity
of 300,000. Volkswagen could now begin producing at this plant. As such, the merger ena-
bled the two firms to take advantage of a 30% spare production capacity and to minimize
costs in the process. Ryser, supra note 32.
36. Ryser, supra note 32. Autolatina may expand into Mexico and Venezuela provided
that the Brazilian/Argentinean effort is eventually profitable. Expansion, supra note 33, at
30.
37. Id.; see also Turner, Autolatina Launches Operations, Expects Losses, AutroMoTrNv
Nzws, July 6, 1987, at 2. Autolatina planned to invest US$1 billion to remodel and update
its facilities over a five year period. Merger in Brazil, supra note 33.
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trols.98 The low prices set by the Government forced Autolatina to
sell below cost, wreaked havoc with the entire auto industry, and
resulted in the important case of Autolatina against the Govern-
ment of Brazil.39
IV. THE WRIT OF SECURITY
A. The Facts
In early 1987, the CIP's price controls critically limited Auto-
latina, forcing it (as well as the other automakers in Brazil) to sell
at 28% below cost.' 0 Faced with the possibility of Autolatina's
moving out of Brazil, Dilson Funaro, the Finance Minister, signed
a Protocol with the National Association of Automakers
(ANFAVEA) on April 8, 1987.4" The Protocol, among other things,
stated that auto producers could pass cost increases along to the
consumer in the price of vehicles every thirty days. In exchange,
Autolatina would invest US$1 billion in the Brazilian auto indus-
try and export US$7.2 billion worth of automobiles by the end of
1989.42 Six days after the signing of the Protocol, the CIP author-
ized Autolatina to increase its prices by 15%, and on May 10, 1987,
another 26%.' 8 After this time, however, the relationship between
Autolatina and the Government grew tense.44
By late September 1987, Autolatina was still registering tre-
38. A Hora do Armisticio, REVSTA VEJA, Mar. 16, 1988, at 78-79 [hereinafter Hora];
Autolatina Sees Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
39. In a nutshell, the price set by the CIP made new cars cheaper than old cars and
caused a consumer stampede (which further fueled inflation). The set prices, however, did
not cover the cost of production of the vehicles. The situation was exacerbated when suppli-
ers refused to provide parts at the Government's frozen prices, thus forcing cuts in produc-
tion and delivery of vehicles. Meanwhile, workers' unions threatened the industry by staging
a two week strike in response to layoffs and firings. See Truell, Brazil's Finance Chief Is
Feeling Heat at Home Amid Talk He May Resign, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 33, col. 2;
Units of Ford, Volkswagen Suspend Brazil Deliveries, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 19, col. 4;
Brazil's New Beat, supra note 5, at 19-21.
40. Expansion, supra note 33, at 30; Bresser Lanca Ofensiva Contra Aumento de
Precos da Autolatina, Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 9, 1987, at 10, col. 3 [hereinafter Ofensiva];
Brazil's Debt Accord Provokes Chorus of Disapproval at Home, LATN AMERCAN WEEKLY
REPORT, Nov. 19, 1987, at 8 [hereinafter Debt Accord]; Autolatina Contra-ataca, REvisTA
SENHOR, Dec. 29, 1987, at 81 [hereinafter Contra-ataca].
41. Contra-ataca, supra note 40, at 81; Resgatar a Equillbrio para Resolver o Caso
Autolatina, Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 10, 1987, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter Resgatar o Equilibria];
Debt Accord, supra note 40; Ofensiva, supra note 40.





mendous losses because of galloping inflation and low prices.4" By
this time, the relationship between the Government and Autola-
tina had deteriorated so much that Autolatina suspended domestic
sales and seriously threatened to leave Brazil. 6 Unable to resolve
the differences with Autolatina, Luis Bresser Pereira, the new Fi-
nance Minister, tore up the Protocol claiming it no longer had any
juridical effect.
47
In response, Autolatina unilaterally raised its prices by 28%,
12% higher than the increase authorized by the Government."
The Government denounced Autolatina's action as a public display
of civil disobedience and imposed punitive measures.4 The puni-
tive measures included curtailing Autolatina's lines of credit with
Banco do Brasil and other federal banks, suspending import and
export licenses, ordering the Receita Federal (Brazil's equivalent of
the Internal Revenue Service) to start a deep investigation into
Autolatina's business records from the previous five years, confis-
cating property, applying the penalty for suspending the sale of
produced vehicles, and threatening to close down the factories for
three to ninety days.50 To avoid these penalties, Autolatina applied
for a writ of security to the Federal Court of Appeals (Tribunal
Federal de Recursos) immediately after the "disobedient" price
increase.5'
45. Postscript: Brazil/Car Industry, LATIN AmzucAN WEEKLY REPoRT, Oct. 15, 1987, at
12; Autolatina Sees Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
46. As Razbes do Autolatina, Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 9, 1987, at 31, col. 2; Brazilian
Subsidiaries of Ford and VW Fight with Government over Price Curbs, Wall St. J., Nov. 9,
1987, at 24, col. 2; see also Contra-ataca, supra note 40.
On September 30, 1987, the Government allowed a 16.5% price increase, but this in-
crease was well below the 28% requested by Autolatina. Ofensiva, supra note 40.
47. Resgatar o Equilibrio, supra note 41.
48. Contra-ataca, supra note 40; Autolatina Defies the Government, LATIN Am.
WEsKLY REP., Nov. 19, 1987, at B.
49. Ofensiva, supra note 40. Bresser Pereira protested that Autolatina's price increase
would further accelerate inflation. Id.
50. For more detailed accounts of the threatened punitive measures, see As Razbes da
Autolatina, supra note 46; Ofensiva, supra note 40; Contra-ataca, supra note 40; Resgatar
o Equilibrio, supra note 41; Debt Accord, supra note 40.
51. Law Number 1.522 (1951) defines the writ of security. Lei No. 1.522, 15 COLETKNEA
DE LEGISLACAO [CoLETN_ A] 527 (Lex 1951). Article 1 states that "the writ of security shall
be granted to protect a clear and certain right, not protected by habeas corpus, whenever
anyone suffers a violation thereof, or there is a just apprehension of suffering such a viola-
tion, [through] illegality or abuse of power on the part of the authority ... " Id. In Brazil,
the writ of security may be used in roughly the same manner as the writ of mandamus is
used in the United States. Judgment of Mar. 6, 1968, Tribunais de Alcada Civil (court of
civil appeals), Braz., 390 Revista dos Tribunals [R.T.] 223. See K. KAisT & K. ROSENN, LAW
A DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AmuRICA, 106-07, 711-12 (1975).
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B. Disposition of the Case
Autolatina sought the writ of security because of the severity
of the actions threatened against it.52 Autolatina claimed that the
Government breached the Protocol by not allowing Autolatina to
raise its prices enough to cover costs.5 The Finance Minister coun-
tered that the price controls were necessary to curtail inflation,
that the Government had granted Autolatina sufficient price in-
creases, and that other smaller factories accepted the CIP's deci-
sions without complaint." The Brazilian Federal Court of Appeals
granted Autolatina a "liminar," similar to a preliminary injunc-
tion, allowing the company to raise its prices until the court
reached a determination on the writ of security.55 The President of
the Federal Supreme Court subsequently upheld the liminar.5 6
Thus, until the Brazilian courts decided the writ of security, the
liminar granted Autolatina the right to raise prices, pursuant to
the Protocol, without the threat of prosecution by the Finance
Ministry. 7 Notwithstanding the liminar, Bresser Pereira contin-
ued the reprisals against Autolatina. ss
Despite early judicial intervention in the dispute, the situation
was ultimately resolved out of court. Autolatina and the Brazilian
Government finally reached a new agreement, very similar to the
Protocol signed in April of 1987. s ' This new agreement, signed by
yet another new Finance Minister, Mailson Ferreira da N6brega, °
52. Resgatar o Equilibrio, supra note 41; As Razbes da Autolatina, supra note 46; TFR
Concede Liminar a Autolatina, Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 10, 1987, at 27, col. 2.
53. Judgment of Nov. 19, 1987, Supremo Tribunal Federal (highest court of appeal),
Braz., - Revista Trimestral de Jurisprud~ncia [R.T.J.] - [hereinafter Liminar]; Autolatina
Defies the Government, supra note 48.
54. Liminar, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Autolatina Appears Close to Pact with Brazil, Wall St. J., Nov. 20,
1987, at 25, col. 6.
57. Liminar, supra note 53; Autolatina Appears Close to Pact with Brazil, supra note
56.
58. Contra-ataca, supra note 40.
59. Hora, supra note 38. Although the temporary decision was favorable to Autolatina,
a favorable final decision would have been more difficult to achieve because a writ of secur-
ity demands that the plaintiff have a "clear and certain right." CoNs'rruVko FEDBRAL [C.F.]
art. 153, § 21 (1969) (Brazil). Whether Autolatina actually had a "clear and certain right" to
raise its prices in order to cover costs is debatable.
60. Bresser Pereira was forced to resign before the new agreement with Autolatina was
signed. His dismissal, however, was not solely the result of the problems with Autolatina.
Mr. Pereira also had policy conflicts with the Central Bank. Still, his dismissal was ulti-
mately due to his disagreement with President Sarney over a new tax package. TFR Con-
1990]
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allowed each sector much greater latitude to adjust its own
prices.0" Autolatina was still required to submit pricing plans to
the CIP, but now Autolatina could, within the limits set forth in
the agreement, set its own prices without waiting for the CIP to
grant permission. 2 In return for this agreement, Autolatina agreed
to drop its lawsuit and promised to invest over US$300 million in
Brazil in 1988.63 In addition, the Finance Minister ratified Autola-
tina's previously enacted price increases." The agreement would
reduce the CIP's role, meanwhile, to that of a watchdog; the CIP
would simply monitor the reasonableness of subsequent price
increases.6 5
C. Future Impact
The agreement between Autolatina and the Government un-
derscored the Sarney Government's weakness. A judicial decision
in this case would have caused the Brazilian Government consider-
able turmoil, regardless of the outcome. 6 A decision for the Gov-
ernment would have given foreign investors the impression that
the Brazilian courts are unlikely to enforce Brazilian Government
contracts where the Government is an unwilling party. On the
other hand, a decision in favor of Autolatina would have directly
negated the potency of an already weak government.
As it turned out, however, the Autolatina case demonstrated
that an important multinational can defy harsh government regu-
lations and force the Government to come to a satisfactory com-
promise. The Autolatina dispute also demonstrated some of the
consequences of inconsistent economic policies that attempt to reg-
cede Liminar a Autolatina, supra note 52.
61. Portaria No. 132, 52 Coi.E'TA.N 348 (Lex 1988) [hereinafter Portarial; see also Bra-
zilian Court Sanctions Ford, VW Price Increase, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1987, at 23, col. 3;
Hora, supra note 38. Portaria (Ordinance) Number 132 represents the legislative codifica-
tion of the new agreement reached between Autolatina and the Brazilian federal administra-
tion. See Legal Letter, Mar. 1988, at 10-11, in PINHEiXo Nro - ADVOGADOS, DOING BusiNiss
IN BRAznL (1990).
62. Portaria, supra note 61.
63. Autolatina Batalha Judicial Continua, Gazeta Mercantil, Nov. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 8;
Hora, supra note 38, at 78.
64. Portaria, supra note 61; Hora, supra note 38, at 78. The ratification was a moot
issue because inflation had made those price adjustments obsolete. The important part of
the agreement was that Autolatina was free to increase its prices according to its costs. Id.
65. Portaria, supra note 61.
66. See Hora, supra note 38.
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ulate inflation with price controls.67 No other manufacturer chal-
lenged the authority of President Sarney and his government as
directly as Autolatina, but all manufacturers were aware that the
new agreement strained the credibility of a government already
under considerable attack. 8
V. PRICE CONTROLS AS EXPROPRIATION
A. Brazilian Law and Creeping Expropriation
Just where state regulation of property rights becomes a tak-
ing by eminent domain standards (i.e., expropriation) is a difficult
question.6e As one commentator has observed, "[iln an era of rapid
inflation, stringent price controls often result in a de facto taking
of property, a contention which Brazilian courts have thus far re-
fused to recognize. '70 The present Brazilian Constitution guaran-
tees property rights - except for expropriation for public necessity,
in which case the expropriated party receives prior and just com-
pensation.7 ' This guarantee is comparable to any other country's
67. See Brazil's Violent Economic Policy Shifts Are Causing Havoc Among Auto Mak-
ers, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1987, at 12, col. 2; Ofensiva, supra note 40.
68. Autolatina Defies the Government, supra note 48. Part of the Sarney Govern-
ment's problem stemmed from the fact that Sarney was not popularly elected president. In
1985, Tancredo Neves was chosen president for a six year term by the electoral college. New
Wine for an Old Jug, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1987, at 36-37. He died before taking office and
Joss Sarney, the vice-president, became president in Neves' stead. Id. Additionally, fighting
within Sarney's own party and Sarney's lack of success in lowering inflation made his posi-
tion unusually precarious. The Little Man Stands Taller, ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 1986, at 39-
40. The Autolatina case only increased the strength of Sarney's opposition.
69. See Rosenn, Treatment of the Foreign Investor: The Brazilian Style, in THE Fu-
TUBE OF BA,.zm 245, 262 (W. Overholt ed. 1978) [hereinafter Brazilian Style]. See also Wes-
ton, Constructive Takings Under International Law: A Modest Foray Into the Problems of
"Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975). The American Law Institute's Re-
statement of the Foreign Relations Law for the United States recognizes that governmental
expropriation results from direct official takings as well as other government actions that
have the effect of a taking. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrm
STATES § 712 comment g (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). The mechanisms through which such
expropriations may be accomplished include taxes, regulations, and other actions that pre-
vent, or unreasonably interfere with, or unduly delay the effective enjoyment of the prop-
erty by an alien. Id.
70. Trends, supra note 17, at 183.
71. The Brazilian Constitution states,
[t]he right of property is guaranteed, except in cases of expropriation for public
necessity or utility or social interest, in which event prior and just compensation
must be paid in cash, subject to the provisions of article 161 permitting the ex-
propriated party to accept payment in government bonds with an exact mone-
tary correction clause. In case of imminent public danger, the competent author-
ities may use private property, assuring compensation to the owner at a later
date.
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constitutional guarantee, including that of the United States. The
Brazilian laws that govern actual expropriation, however, are not
faithful to the ideals expressed in the Brazilian Constitution.
72
In Brazil, an official expropriation is triggered by a Presiden-
tial decree of public necessity or social interest designating a par-
ticular piece of property.7" Once the President declares a public
necessity, it is very difficult to argue against the taking of the
property.74 Moreover, the function of the court system, in a con-
test, is solely to determine the proper compensation.7 5 Under the
Brazilian Constitution, compensation is required for a direct tak-
ing.76 Although the Autolatina case never reached the merits,
Autolatina might have argued that the Protocol signed by Autola-
tina and the Finance Minister, Bresser Pereira, created a protected
right to raise prices. Thus, the breach of the Protocol was a direct
taking of a property right, and Autolatina was consequently enti-
tled to just compensation under the Brazilian Constitution. Even
C. art. 153, § 22 (1967, amended 1969) (Brazil).
Property is broadly defined in Brazil to comprise an interest that has a legally recog-
nized value. See P. DE MIRANDA, CoMrrARIos A CONSTrruIrAO DE 1967 at 364-66 (1968).
The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 also provides that a party's property may only be
expropriated for public necessity and that the party must receive prior compensation. C.F.
art. 179, § 22 (1824) (Brazil); see also CF. art. 122, § 14 (1937) (Brazil) (extending private
property protections to resident aliens).
72. Decree-Law Number 3.365 (1941) defines actual expropriation. Decreto-Lei No.
3.365, 5 COLkrAMA 326 (Lex 1941). See also Brazilian Style, supra note 69, at 248; see
generally A. LOWENFILD, EXPROPiAON IN THE AmamcAs (1971).
73. C.F. art. 153, § 22 (1967, amended 1969) (Brazil). Social interest takings began in
1946 as part of a project for agrarian land reform and urban renewal. The properties were
taken and then redistributed to private parties. C.F. art. 146, § 16 (1946) (Brazil).
74. An executive decree for an expropriation for public necessity is not valid if there is
neither a settlement nor a commencement of a condemnation suit within five years. A settle-
ment or suit for a social interest taking must be started within two years. Decreto-Lei 3.365,
art. 14, 5 COLETIAEA 328 (Lex 1941); Lei No. 4.132, art. 3, 26 COLTANEA 309 (Lex 1962).
75. Brazilian Style, supra note 69, at 249.
76. The Brazilian courts typically have three appraisers of the value of the expropriated
property, one hired by each of the parties and one assigned by the judge. Most often, the
judge follows his own appraiser. Decree-Law Number 3.365 lists the following factors to be
considered in determining the value of the property: 1) tax assessment value; 2) acquisition
cost; 3) income derived from the property; 4) location; 5) state of repair; 6) valuation for
insurance purposes; 7) market value of comparable property during the past five years; and
8) enhancement or depreciation of the expropriated party's remaining property. Decreto-Lei
No. 3.365, art. 27, 5 CoLErANEA 330 (Lex 1941).
Compensation, once determined, must be paid in cash, unless the expropriation is part
of agrarian reform, in which case the Constitution permits payment in bonds which are
adjustable for inflation. CF. art. 157 § 1 (1969) (Brazil), as amended by Ato Institucional
No. 9, 33 CoLrkmA 473 (Lex 1969).
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without the Protocol, governmental policies forcing Autolatina to
operate at a huge loss arguably constituted creeping expropriation,
entitling Autolatina to compensation.
Price controls that lag behind inflation may force firms to op-
erate at a loss, especially considering the law prohibiting a firm
from holding onto its production. Although there is no concrete
evidence that the CIP intentionally uses its power to force compa-
nies to operate at a loss,7" the delays, paperwork, and uncertainty
involved are devastating to firms subject to controlled prices. In
any event, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, in Sociedade de
Laticinios Domino Ltda. v. Uniao Federal, stated that price con-
trols without subsidization are not an unconstitutional taking of
property, even if they force a firm to operate at a loss."
Due to the ever increasing amount of foreign investment in
Brazil, the Sociedade decision may be unsound policy. Autolatina
lost over US$400 million in 1987. 79 Obviously, a firm cannot con-
tinue indefinitely with such losses and will eventually leave Brazil
if the situation is not corrected. Furthermore, Brazil desperately
needs the capital investment that the large multinationals, espe-
cially Autolatina, provide."0 Eventually, Autolatina and the Gov-
ernment came to an agreement that was satisfactory to both sides.
However, due to the instability surrounding the Sarney Adminis-
tration, the agreement's durability is questionable. In sum, given
Brazil's great economic needs and government instability, the Bra-
zilian courts ought to grow more cognizant of the policy arguments
which favor protecting economic property rights.
B. An International Claims1
The United Nations has recognized that property owners must
77. Trends, supra note 17, at 183.
78. Judgment of May 31, 1965, Supremo Tribunal Federal (highest court of appeals),
Braz., 33 R.T.J. 720. To be sure, Brazilian courts have seldom granted compensation for
indirect takings. Indeed, the Brazilian courts have tolerated disguised expropriation in vari-
ous forms. See Brazilian Style, supra note 69, at 252-53. Still, there is at least one case
where compensation was ordered for an indirect taking. In Agro Florestal Giorgi Ltda. v.
Fazenda do Estado, the court required compensation for a state prohibition against cutting
timber on private property. Judgment of August 4, 1971, Tribunasi de Algada Civil (court of
civil appeals), Braz., 431 R.T. 141.
79. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
80. See generally BRAzEL's ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FuTuRE, supra note 18.
81. In addition to having a claim under Brazilian and international law, a company like
Autolatina might have found protection with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
1990]
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receive compensation in cases involving expropriation for public
utility, security, or national interest."s Without an agreement to
the contrary, local remedies must be exhausted before a claim can
be brought in the international arena.83 An international claim
may be based merely on a "denial of justice,"8 ' but the com-
plaining party must show more than his own dissatisfaction in or-
der to be heard.8a A denial of justice may be defined as a lack of
the proper court in which to hear the case, lack of access to that
court, a refusal to decide the case, or an unjustifiable delay in de-
ciding the controversy. The Brazilian court system did not deny
access or refuse to decide the Autolatina case. Still, had the Brazil-
ian courts reached a decision against Autolatina on the merits,
thus forcing Autolatina to suffer continued dramatic losses into the
future, Autolatina might have argued that the Brazilian court sys-
tem, in effect, never really heard Autolatina's complaint. Thus,
Autolatina would argue that justice had been denied.
(OPIC). OPIC is a privately-run, United States Government agency that offers insurance for
overseas investors. OPIC insures against expropriation and defines that term broadly. Ac-
cording to the statute governing OPIC, expropriation is "any abrogation, repudiation, or
impairment by a foreign government of its own contract with an investor when such abroga-
tion, repudiation, or impairment is not caused by the investor's own fault or misconduct and
materially adversely affects the continued operation of the project." 22 U.S.C. § 2191(b)
(1982). In order to recover from OPIC, therefore, Autolatina would have to demonstrate
that Bresser Pereira's abrogation of the Protocol was not Autolatina's own fault. Unfortu-
nately, Autolatina was not insured with OPIC and could not pursue such a claim. See gener-
ally Shanks, Insuring Investment and Loans Against Currency Incontrovertability, Expro-
priation, and Political Violence, 9 HASTINGS INl'L & CoM. L. Rzv. 417 (1986).
82. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over National Resources, 9 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 17 at 107, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963). A similar
statement is found in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 15 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 300, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
However, there is an important difference between the Resolution and the Charter. The
Resolution states that, in a case of expropriation, the owner shall be paid appropriate com-
pensation under the standards of the expropriating state and international law. In contrast,
the Charter provides that appropriate compensation should be paid and that any controver-
sies will be settled under the domestic laws of that state.
Like the United Nations, the American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States recognizes that states are responsible for takings without just
compensation. This responsibility covers the direct taking of property,. repudiation or
breach of contract, and arbitrary or discriminatory acts that impair property or other eco-
nomic interests of a foreign national. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
83. See generally F.V. GARCIA-AmADOR, 2 THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS
§ 19 (1984).
84. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, 1 THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS § 6 (1984);
Weston, supra note 69, at 117, 171.
85. GARCIA-AmAiOR, supra note 82; Weston, supra note 69, at 117, 171.
86. See GARclA-AmADOR, supra note 84.
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Once an international claim is established, the next question is
whether international law requires compensation. The Restate-
ment of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides
that a state is responsible under international law for an economic
injury resulting from the following state actions:
(2) a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a
national of another state ...
(b) where the foreign national is not given an adequate fo-
rum to determine his claim of breach or is not compen-
sated for any breach determined to have occurred;
(3) other arbitrary or discriminatory acts or omissions by the
state that impair property or other economic interests of a na-
tional of another state.
8 7
Bresser Pereira's breach of the Protocol with Autolatina seemingly
falls within the scope of the Restatement, but the Restatement
comments explain that not every breach constitutes a violation of
international law. 8 Under international law, a state is only respon-
sible for such a breach when it is discriminatory or done for gov-
ernmental rather than commercial reasons.8 " In Autolatina's case,
Bresser Pereira prohibited the Protocol's price increases in an at-
tempt to control inflation. Arguably, this reasoning is governmen-
tal as opposed to commercial and would therefore entitle Autola-
tina to compensation under the Restatement's standard.
Meanwhile, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal con-
fronted the gray area where no formal taking is announced yet an
alien's property is effectively seized.90 The Tribunal held that com-
pensation is required where the Government interferes with an
alien's use and control of, or derivation of economic benefits from,
property." The Tribunal used a standard of "reasonableness" on
the degree of interference to be tolerated." As such, the Tribunal
focused on the economic reality of the situation, and recognized
87. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1985).
88. Id. comment h.
89. Id.
90. See Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensa-
tion: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L
LAW. 643 (1987).
91. Golpira v. Iran, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 171, 177 (1983); Int'l Technical Prods. Corp. v.
Iran, 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 206 (1985). See Brower, supra note 90.




that expropriation may occur without a direct taking of tangible
property.8 In an international setting, Autolatina could apply the
Tribunal decisions to recover the huge losses it suffered due to the
Brazilian price control policies. The Brazilian policy forced Autola-
tina to operate at such a deficit as to constitute an unreasonable
interference with Autolatina's derivation of income and economic
benefits from its property. Thus, pursuant to Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal precedent, Autolatina is entitled to just compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the new agreement was the only viable
solution to the conflict. A decision on the merits for Autolatina
would have severely undermined the power of the already unstable
Brazilian administration. A decision for the Finance Minister
would have discouraged foreign investment in Brazil, which is cru-
cial to the Brazilian economy. The new agreement between Autola-
tina and Brazil essentially resurrected the old Protocol. Thus,
peace was restored between Autolatina and Brazil. With the vola-
tility of the Government, however, the duration of this armistice is
uncertain.
Nonetheless, there is potential for a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship between Autolatina and Brazil. Autolatina can invest
heavily in Brazil and, in turn, make suitable profits. Price controls,
however, created seemingly insurmountable problems. The Autola-
tina case demonstrated that multinationals do have recourse when
faced with an uncooperative foreign government. Autolatina defied
the edicts of the Finance Minister and won a temporary decision in
its favor. Faced with the possibility of a final decision also in favor
of Autolatina, the Brazilian Government agreed to discontinue
price controls. In the future, if problems arise, Autolatina might
successfully pursue an international and/or domestic claim of ex-
propriation against Brazil and recover losses caused by governmen-
tal policies. The Brazilian Government, therefore, faces perennial
vulnerability until it cultivates stable, coherent, and workable eco-
nomic policies.
93. Golpira, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 171; Int'l Technical Prods. Corp., 9 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 206; Brower, supra note 90, at 644 n.108.
[Vol. 21:3
